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RECENTLY, the region was caught up in the escalation between the United States and Iran. Some expected a war between the two sides, while others ruled out the war. Nevertheless, it was remarkable that the West and the United States did not take a hostile position against Iran when it raised the slogan “exporting the revolution abroad”. Similarly, Iran has infiltrated Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, and has supported its followers without stirring the West. In contrast, the West appeared to be economically cooperative with Iran, especially Germany and France. It is true that America imposed sanctions in the past decade, particularly after the Iranian nuclear programme, but the West remained cooperative with Iran. All this put Iran in a position that appears to be a contradiction between Western exchange of economic interests with Iran and acceptance for Iran’s political intervention in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.
So, what makes the Western position and the Iranian position seem contradictory and at the same time seem cooperative? Iran’s relationship with the West and the United States intersects in a common space governed by four ruling engines: fear of minority, economic interests, geostrategic gains and supporting Israel. These engines interact with each other but with different weights. Sometimes the weight of economic interests is higher than other ruling engines, while in other cases, the geostrategic gains are the highest weight and so on. Of course, there are internal drives in each country, but ultimately they become one of the four ruling engines.
As Iran is a Shiite Muslim country, Tehran itself is a target for global powers to blackmail other Muslim countries through fearing them from Iran’s expansion in the area. In addition, the engine of economic interests is a very imperative drive, especially as Iran is an exporter of oil and gas and a consumer for many Western products at the same time. While, the third engine, the geostrategic gains, creates a common area where the West and America exchange the manoeuvre with Iran to achieve all parties’ interests. This engine generates sort of ambiguity in the reality of the relationship amongst them. Whereas, the fourth engine, which is supporting Israel, appears from time to time, yet it is a ruling driver in the Iranian-American relationship, where America seeks to provide protection and reassurance to Israel.
Analysing the four engines makes it easier to infer the nature of the relationship and the expected results of each manoeuvre with Iran, where each manoeuvre has its own rules and its own dominating engine. Thus, the engine of supporting Israel may seem active in a situation, but in turn, the engine of intimidation of the Gulf countries from Iran to complete multi-billion dollar weapons deals is the most active. This explains the blurry in the relationship; therefore, it is crucial to look at the most active engine among others in order to understand the situation and to predict the direction of the manoeuvre.
Reflecting on the recent escalation, all four engines have worked together, creating a high haze in the scene’s expectations. However, since these four engines are acting at different weights, it is significant to determine the engine of higher weight and accordingly which engine will drive the scene. The engine of minority and intimidation from Iran has been functioning for decades to justify the US protection.
On the other hand, the US has activated the economic engine to press the West to stop trading with Iran. In return, the economic engine has exploited the Gulf States to pay the cost and complete more arms deals. While the engine of supporting Israel works to strike Iran supported by the American the Christian Zionists has been active for more than ten years. However, the weightiest engine is the geostrategic engine that does not push to bring the matter to the state of war. It can be anticipated that the purpose of this escalation is to bring Iran back to the negotiating table with the US, where Trump is expecting to reshape the agreement as he sees it, not as the Europeans see it … Exactly as he changed the NAFTA agreement with Canada and Mexico.
Accordingly, there is no major interest for US strategy, until this moment, to rush into a war with Iran. The United States tries to optimise its geostrategic gains through reshaping the nuclear agreement with Iran and to put economic pressure on it to change the regime’s behaviour. On the other hand, there is no Iranian interest in being drawn into a war with the United States, since the costs will be very high. Putting into account that the Iranian leadership is manoeuvrable and has a deterrent power, it tries to manipulate with the United States to maintain a proper strategic position.
Finally, is the possibility of war exists? Undoubtedly, complex and turbulent environments may slip into the worst as a result of a small event that may not be seen important either because of misjudgments, recklessness or even by a third-party intervention. In addition, if the weight of Israel’s defence engine raises supported by the hardliners in the US administration who are driven by religious beliefs, then there will be a possibility for war. Particularly the areas of misjudgment, interference by a third party, or providing a justification for the American hardliners (extremists) are available and abundant due to the hot zones of friction due to the Gulf and Yemen tension, Iraq complications, and Syrian chaos.
(Dr Wael Shadid is a strategist, researcher, and project management consultant. He is the author of ‘Complexity management:
Managing organisations in
complex environments’.)
So, what makes the Western position and the Iranian position seem contradictory and at the same time seem cooperative? Iran’s relationship with the West and the United States intersects in a common space governed by four ruling engines: fear of minority, economic interests, geostrategic gains and supporting Israel. These engines interact with each other but with different weights. Sometimes the weight of economic interests is higher than other ruling engines, while in other cases, the geostrategic gains are the highest weight and so on. Of course, there are internal drives in each country, but ultimately they become one of the four ruling engines.
As Iran is a Shiite Muslim country, Tehran itself is a target for global powers to blackmail other Muslim countries through fearing them from Iran’s expansion in the area. In addition, the engine of economic interests is a very imperative drive, especially as Iran is an exporter of oil and gas and a consumer for many Western products at the same time. While, the third engine, the geostrategic gains, creates a common area where the West and America exchange the manoeuvre with Iran to achieve all parties’ interests. This engine generates sort of ambiguity in the reality of the relationship amongst them. Whereas, the fourth engine, which is supporting Israel, appears from time to time, yet it is a ruling driver in the Iranian-American relationship, where America seeks to provide protection and reassurance to Israel.
Analysing the four engines makes it easier to infer the nature of the relationship and the expected results of each manoeuvre with Iran, where each manoeuvre has its own rules and its own dominating engine. Thus, the engine of supporting Israel may seem active in a situation, but in turn, the engine of intimidation of the Gulf countries from Iran to complete multi-billion dollar weapons deals is the most active. This explains the blurry in the relationship; therefore, it is crucial to look at the most active engine among others in order to understand the situation and to predict the direction of the manoeuvre.
Reflecting on the recent escalation, all four engines have worked together, creating a high haze in the scene’s expectations. However, since these four engines are acting at different weights, it is significant to determine the engine of higher weight and accordingly which engine will drive the scene. The engine of minority and intimidation from Iran has been functioning for decades to justify the US protection.
On the other hand, the US has activated the economic engine to press the West to stop trading with Iran. In return, the economic engine has exploited the Gulf States to pay the cost and complete more arms deals. While the engine of supporting Israel works to strike Iran supported by the American the Christian Zionists has been active for more than ten years. However, the weightiest engine is the geostrategic engine that does not push to bring the matter to the state of war. It can be anticipated that the purpose of this escalation is to bring Iran back to the negotiating table with the US, where Trump is expecting to reshape the agreement as he sees it, not as the Europeans see it … Exactly as he changed the NAFTA agreement with Canada and Mexico.
Accordingly, there is no major interest for US strategy, until this moment, to rush into a war with Iran. The United States tries to optimise its geostrategic gains through reshaping the nuclear agreement with Iran and to put economic pressure on it to change the regime’s behaviour. On the other hand, there is no Iranian interest in being drawn into a war with the United States, since the costs will be very high. Putting into account that the Iranian leadership is manoeuvrable and has a deterrent power, it tries to manipulate with the United States to maintain a proper strategic position.
Finally, is the possibility of war exists? Undoubtedly, complex and turbulent environments may slip into the worst as a result of a small event that may not be seen important either because of misjudgments, recklessness or even by a third-party intervention. In addition, if the weight of Israel’s defence engine raises supported by the hardliners in the US administration who are driven by religious beliefs, then there will be a possibility for war. Particularly the areas of misjudgment, interference by a third party, or providing a justification for the American hardliners (extremists) are available and abundant due to the hot zones of friction due to the Gulf and Yemen tension, Iraq complications, and Syrian chaos.
(Dr Wael Shadid is a strategist, researcher, and project management consultant. He is the author of ‘Complexity management:
Managing organisations in
complex environments’.)
